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Abstract  
UAVNs (unmanned aerial vehicle networks) may become vulnerable to threats and attacks due to 
their characteristic features such as highly dynamic network topology, open-air wireless 
environments, and high mobility. Since previous work has focused on classical and metaheuristic-
based approaches, none of these approaches have a self-adaptive approach. In this paper, the 
challenges and weaknesses of previous methods are examined in the form of a table. Furthermore, we 
propose an agent-based self-protective method (ASP-UAVN) for UAVNs that is based on the Human 
Immune System (HIS). In ASP-UAS, the safest route from the source UAV to the destination UAV is 
chosen according to a self-protective system. In this method, a multi-agent system using an Artificial 
Immune System (AIS) is employed to detect the attacking UAV and choose the safest route. In the 
proposed ASP-UAVN, the route request packet (RREQ) is initially transmitted from the source UAV 
to the destination UAV to detect the existing routes. Then, once the route reply packet (RREP) is 
received, a self-protective method using agents and the knowledge base is employed to choose the 
safest route and detect the attacking UAVs. The proposed ASP-UAVN has been validated and 
evaluated in two ways: simulation and theoretical analysis. The results of simulation evaluation and 
theory analysis showed that the ASP-UAS increases the Packet Delivery Rate (PDR) by more than 
17.4, 20.8, and 25.91%, and detection rate by more than 17.2, 23.1, and 29.3%, and decreases the 
Packet Loss Rate (PLR) by more than 14.4, 16.8, and 20.21%, the false-positive and false-negative 
rate by more than 16.5, 25.3, and 31.21% those of SUAS-HIS, SFA and BRUIDS methods, 
respectively. 
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1 Introduction 
An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is, in fact, an aircraft flying with no human pilot on board. 
Instead, an operator or the on-board computer systems control autonomously its flight either 
remotely. By developments in computing, device miniaturization and communication, other flying 
objects including quadcopters, gliders, and balloons could be also included in UAVs. Historically, 
military operations utilized in missions imposing high-risk levels to human pilots. However, more 
applications were recently found in civilian domains for UAVs. They involve rescue and search 
operations, inspection, and policing [1,2, and 3]. Figure 1 and 2 shows two examples of Civil 
applications. The setup involves multiple components and numerous links to communication. The 
task of each link is to transmit certain kinds of information and data. Generally, based on the kind of 
transmitted information, 3 various types of links should exist in these networks, i.e. radio 
communication, Satellite link, and U2U. The radio communication links transmit telemetry data, 
control audio, and video information. Furthermore, the task of satellite links is to carry GPS, 
meteorological, and weather information, along with the data transferred by the radio 
communication links. UAV applications in the field of Civil have been added to the paper in detail 
as the following. Because of the high movement of the UAVs, their simple deployment, floating 
capability, and their low maintenance cost, they are usable in many civil applications. Moreover, 
using UAVs in most civil applications like real-time monitoring, wireless coverage, remote sensing, 
movie generation, goods delivery, search and rescue, precise farming, security and monitoring, and 
aerial photography are growing rapidly. Also, it is predicted that the civil infrastructures have 45 
billion dollars of the market value of using UAVs. Now, using small UAVs has been expanding 
rapidly including a wide range of general and commercial works such as Entertainment, shipping, 
delivery, low enforcement, wildlife monitoring, help to search and rescue operations, gathering 
news, an inspection of pipelines and other infrastructures, estates, taking photo, geology, help the 
accidents, and entertainments. 
     Further discussion is provided in the following sections in this regard to prove the applications of 
UAVs with innate time sensitivity, and to indicate the insistence of offering security in 
communication channels [2]. Nevertheless, despite the advantages of UAVs in different applications 
as a result of the circumstances where the activities are monitored by no pilot, they are potentially 
susceptible to lethal threats. This strengthens the emergence of designing reliable and secure UASs 
and overcoming the challenges to prevent destruction and damage to other systems and human lives 
[3]. 
 
      Hence, UAVs become a fascinating target of lethal attacks, theft, and manipulation. Some 
attacks including Sinkhole (SH), Wormhole (WH), and Selective Forwarding (SF) improperly enter 
the system. When an attack affects the unmanned system, it is difficult to remove the threat and 
bring the system back online. It is worth to mention that the usual approaches to secure information, 
like intrusion detection or encryption [4] are insufficient to deal with such risks. For elaborating, the 
stated outlines do not take into account the actuator and sensor measurements compatibility factor 
with the control mechanism and physical procedure of the UAV, which are considerable for the 
protection outline. The malevolent UAV is strong against 3 lethal attacks (SH, WH, and SF) within 
the ASP-UAVN proposed design, hence, the intrusive operations are rapidly recognized and 
eliminated from the or top-secret data surveillance spying missions. Within the suggested schema, 
the critical standards of service quality are improved such as PLR, PDR, detection rates, false-
negative, and false-positive rates.  
This study is mainly focused as follows: 
• Analyzing the UAV network to discover unknown attacks launched by external or internal 
attackers 
• Designing an efficient intrusion and self-protective detection system utilizing an AIS for 
unknown and known attacks in UAV. 
• Providing a set of descriptions of the most related routing protocols in the literature 
accompanied by their disadvantages. Moreover, we performed a comparative investigation for 
examining the deficiencies between our suggested scheme and the evaluated protocols. 
• Performing a set of simulations to investigate the realistic impacts of UAVNs environments 
over our suggested protocol. The efficiency of ASP-UAVN was demonstrated by the attained 
results. 
 
 
Figure 1: The first scenario of civil applications [5]. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The second scenario of civil applications. 
 
 
    This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the security attacks and previous methods are 
explained in detail. Section 3, describes the human immune system (HIS) as an algorithm. The 
details of the proposed method are given in Section 4. In Section 5 of the paper, the theoretical 
security analysis of ASP-UAVN is described. In Section 6, the simulation results are discussed in the 
form of tables and figures. Finally, the conclusion and future work of this paper are done in section 
7. 
 
 
2 Lethal security threats and detection schemes 
Here, the destructive attacks targeting UAVs, as well as previous methods used to defend against 
such destructive UAVs, are described in detail. 
 
2.1 Lethal Security Threats 
It was prone that UAVs are function degradation and cyber-security threats as active or passive since 
they depend on wireless channels for communicating. Figure 3 provides a list of main lethal security 
targeting UAVs. The following vulnerabilities are concerned with this study: 
 
- Wormhole Attack: Or WH attacks are the main attack threatening the UAVs. In WH attacks, data 
packets are received by a hostile node at a definite location in UAV, and the packets are 
tunnelled to another hostile node at a distant point to regulate the packets to its adjacent nodes. It 
is possible to establish this tunnel using multiple techniques including a channel established out 
of band, a high-powered transmission, or an encapsulated packet. In these approaches, through 
tunnels, the packet transmitted is received rather directly or with fewer hop counts in comparison 
to ordinary packets that are conveyed via a multi-hop path. This method establishes an illusion 
whit two close tunnel endpoints [6]. Hence, the hostile nodes are made as decoys within the 
destination and source nodes that can accomplish subversions like packet manipulation and 
droppings. 
 
- Selective Forwarding Attack: In this attack, a forged RREP is transmitted by an SF node while 
receiving an RREQ packet, appealing an unexpired and shorter route, even for missing the 
destination entry from the routing table. By reaching the created RREP packet the source node, a 
route is established via this malevolent middle node, to remove all legitimate RREP messages 
conveyed from destination nodes and another intermediate. Thus, the data traffic is successfully 
attracted by the BH node to that destination by misleading the source. Then, all the data packets 
are dropped by the SF node rather than forwarding the incoming messages. By forging a 
transmission route, the hop count is reset by the BH node to a very low value as well as the 
number of destination sequence to the quite high value to increment the reception opportunity at 
the source node. The SF attack can also launch from the source node through making fields-
source sequence numbers in hop counts and RREQ packets, leading to harming the directing 
tables in middle nodes and the destination nodes [7]. 
 
- Sink hole Attack: One of the main attacks threatening the UAVNs is the attack known as the 
Sinkhole (SH) attack. In these attacks, a malicious node broadcasts illusive information regarding 
the routings to impose itself as a route towards specific nodes for the neighbouring nodes and 
thus, attract data traffic. The objective of this process is to draw all the traffic in the network 
towards the sinkhole node and as a result, alter the packets of data or silently drop them 
altogether. Sinkhole attacks can increase the network overhead, increase the consumption of 
energy and decrease the life time of the network , and ultimately annihilate the network [8].  
 
 
Figure 3:  UAVNs lethal security threats 
 
 
2.2 Detection schemes 
Through different security measurements in different ways, lethal attacks were addressed and the 
UAV was protected against these attacks. It is not a new subject, and numerous studies were 
performed to provide various methods to state these attacks. 
     In [10], a security framework was proposed by the authors to offer protection against malicious 
performance targeting SFA communication systems in aircraft. According to the numerical 
outcomes presented in this work, the suggested security framework leads to prediction and detection 
rates with high accuracy in comparison with the intrusion detection approaches in the literature. 
    An adaptive IDS is suggested in [11], in terms of device specifications to find suspicious UAVs in 
cooperative operations with substantial operation continuity. the UAVs are audited by the suggested 
IDS system in a distributed system for determining their state whether normally functioning or under 
malicious attacks. In this study, the efficiency of the suggested rule-based UAV IDS (BRUIDS) 
performance is investigated on random, reckless, and opportunistic intrusive performances (usual 
cyber-attack behavioural techniques). The suggested technique is the base for the audition on 
behavioural rules to quickly investigate a UAV’s survivability under malevolent attacks. 
    In [12], the authors suggest a way to improve drone security against wormhole, black hole, 
grayhole and fake information dissemination attacks so that communications can be conducted 
securely. This has two advantages: First, it has a high accuracy of detection and also a low false 
positive and negative rate. Second, it quickly detects and isolates attacks. 
     This study supports using the movement data and each UAV’s residual energy level for 
guaranteeing high-level communication stability while forecasting a sudden link breakage before 
occurring. Using a strong route detection process, routing paths are explored to take into account the 
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link breakage prediction, the balanced energy consumption, and the connectivity level of the 
explored pathways [13]. 
    In [14], a data dissemination method is provided by constructing a virtual topology based on the 
charge of WSN nodes using software-defined networks (SDNs) via UAVs. Constantly, the topology 
is monitored and reconfigured if necessary. For facilitating simultaneous communication with the 
ground nodes, the SDN controller and the base station, the aerial nodes are armed with multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) antennas. Within the proposed method, an efficient sleep timer and 
back-off counter approaches are used as well. The topology formation and preservation of a sleep 
timer and a back-off counter are facilitated by the SDN controller. 
     The problem is intensified by a sporadic network connection disrupting communication in UAVs. 
Therefore, a drone requires a deep learning-based, adaptive Intrusion Detection System to recognize 
its intruders and guarantee its safe return-to-home (RTH). In the suggested IDS, using Self-Taught 
Learning (STL) with a multiclass SVM, the IDS’s high true positive rate is maintained, even in 
unknown territory. The Deep-Q Network is used by the self-healing technique in the IDS recovery 
phase that is a deep reinforcement learning algorithm for dynamic route learning facilitating the safe 
return home of the drone. Based on the simulation outcomes, the effectiveness of the proposed IDS 
is represented [15]. 
    In [16], the UAV (physical layer security of an unmanned aerial vehicle) network is studied, in 
which the information is transmitted by a UAV-B (UAV base station) confidential to multiple 
information receivers (IRs) by assisting a UAV jammer (UAVJ) by existing the multiple 
eavesdroppers. Here, an optimization problem is formulated to mutually design the trajectories and 
convey the power of UAV-J and UAV-B for maximizing the minimum average secrecy rate overall 
IRs. The optimization problem is non-convex with the coupled optimization variables leading to the 
mathematically inflexible optimization problem. Hence, the optimization problem is decomposed 
into two subproblems and then solved using the succeeding convex approximation technique and an 
alternating iterative algorithm. 
     In [17], two aspects of secure communication and cooperative control are considered. The 
cooperative control is implemented by a clustering algorithm to increase the speed of converging the 
multi-UAV formation. Adjusting the flight control factor for accelerating the convergence of multi-
UAV, a flock is created by the UAV group. For facilitating secure communication, the hierarchical 
virtual communication ring (HVCR) strategy is arranged to decrease the boundary of group 
communication and minimalize the insecure range. 
    In this paper, a method is proposed to maintain the security in UAV networks within surveillance, 
by verifying the data regarding events occurring from various sources. Hence, UAV networks are 
able to adapt peer-to-peer information stimulated by the blockchain principles and to discover the 
compromised UAVs in terms of trust policies. In the suggested method, secure asymmetric 
encryption is used with the official UAVs’ pre-shared list. This method makes possible to detect the 
wrong information when hijacking an official UAV physically [18]. 
       In [19], the authors suggest a method called SCOTRES, which uses five criteria to enhance 
network decision making and increase lifetime and load balance in the network. This method also 
considers the energy consumption of the nodes to provide cooperation between the nodes. 
     This paper investigates the trajectory design and resource allocating for energy-efficient secure 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) communication systems in which multiple legitimate ground users 
are served by a UAV base station while existing a potential eavesdropper. Our objective is to 
maximize the UAV’s energy efficiency while optimization of its user scheduling, transmit power, 
velocity, and trajectory. The formulation of the design is a nonconvex optimization problem 
considering the minimum data rate requirement of each user, the maximum tolerable signal-to-noise 
ratio (SNR) leakage, and the location ambiguity of the eavesdropper. To attain an efficient 
suboptimal solution, an iterative algorithm is suggested [20]. 
     This paper studies a joint optimization problem of ground terminals (GTs) association under 
wiretap channels, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight trajectory, and downlink transmission 
power. Precisely, a scenario is considered, in which a group of GTs is served by a UAV and the 
minimum secrecy rate is maximized to guarantee the fairness among GTs. We establish an iterative 
algorithm in terms of the alternating and successive convex approximation (SCA) approaches for 
solving the nonconvex optimization problem [21]. 
     Through unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), it is possible to support surveillance even in areas 
with no network infrastructure. By UAV networks, the security challenges are raised as a result of its 
dynamic topology. In the present study, a method is proposed to maintain the security in UAV 
networks within the framework of surveillance, by verifying data regarding events from various 
sources. Thus, UAV networks are able to adapt peer-to-peer general information stimulated by the 
blockchain ethics in terms of the trust policies. In this technique, secure asymmetric encryption is 
used with a pre-shared list of official UAVs. This work states detecting the misinformation when 
hijacking an official UAV physically [22]. 
     In [23], an innovative trust model is proposed for UAVNs in terms of the mobility and 
performance pattern of UAV nodes and the features of inter-UAV channels. The suggested trust 
model includes 4 parts of the indirect trust section, the direct trust section, the trust update section, 
and the integrated trust section. According to the trust model, the perception of a secure link in 
UAVNs is formulated existing only a trust link and a physical link between two UAVs. Furthermore, 
the connectivity of UAVNs is analyzed by adapting the metrics of the secure connectivity 
probability and physical connectivity probability between two UAVs. Utilizing stochastic geometry 
with Doppler shift or without it, we originate analytical and accurate expressions of the secure 
connectivity probability and the physical connectivity probability. 
     In [24], a security model is suggested in terms of Identity Based (IB) authentication outline for 
UAV-integrated HetNets. the AVISPA tool is used to screen the absolutism of such a proposed 
scheme and some of its results indicated that our outline is resistant to the susceptibilities of 
intruders like replay, and impersonation. 
Table 1 provides a complete overview of previous work in terms of; features and validation tools. 
All of the articles presented in this study have been published in famous journals. Also, these articles 
are acceptable in terms of citation level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Comparison between detection schemes for UAV 
Ref Attack type Features  Validation 
[10] Cyber attack • Reduce overheads 
• Solve privacy  
• Increase confidentiality 
NS-3 
[11] Opportunistic attacker • Solve security issues arise during M2M communication 
• Achieves high level security 
Mathematical 
[12] Cyber security threats • Increase confidentiality 
• Increase the detection rate 
NS-3 
[13] Flooding • Upgrading the network lifetime parameter by minimizing 
energy consumption 
NS-2 
[14] Hybrid • Securing long-term user’s identity privacy 
• Achieves high level security 
• Increase of QoS 
NS-3 
[15] Jamming attacks • Self-healing 
• Improvement of accuracy, sensitivity and specificity 
ONE simulator 
[16] Physical layer security • Overcoming old key management that did not perform 
well. 
• Identification and mutual authentication 
• Achieves high level security 
NUMERICAL 
[17] Hidden terminals • Minimizes energy consumption 
• Overcome the symmetric key distribution 
• Identification and mutual authentication 
MATLAB 
[24] Packet modification attacks • Increase confidentiality 
• Overcome the challenges of traditional public key 
Avispa Tool 
 
 
3 Human Immune System (HIS) 
HIS as the human’s basic protection system supports human beings to survive diseases and 
environmental threats. Furthermore, by resembling the internet to humans in different ways, it is 
possible to develop an immune system for the internet in terms of the HIS’s fundamentals. 
Immunity system denotes all bodily mechanisms in charge of protection of the body against 
detrimental agents in the situation like microorganisms and their products, pollen grains, drugs, and 
chemicals. The HIS includes three defensive lines operating in cooperation. Mucous, skin, 
secretions of skin, and membranes are included in the first layer. Phagocytic white blood cells, the 
inflammatory responses, and antimicrobial proteins are the subsections for the second layer. 
Ultimately, the third layer as the specific defensive mechanism involves antibodies and 
lymphocytes. Antibodies react to aberrant body cells, particular microorganisms, toxins and other 
materials signed by foreign molecules specifically. Two innate immunity system and acquired 
immunity system are included in the human immunity system [24]. 
 
 
3.1 HIS Algorithm 
According to the former part, the HIS is a relatively complex mechanism able to protect the body 
against a tremendous group of irrelevant pathogens. It constructed mechanism of HIS is remarkably 
effective considerably in self and non-self-antigens distinction. The non-self-antigen is any external 
factor able to trigger an immune response like an attack or the bacteria. However, self-antigens are 
on the reverse side of non-self-antigens. The self-antigens are the cells of the living. Clonal 
selection, affinity, and negative selection are the main theories about HIS algorithms [24]. The 
pseudo-code for the Negative Selection Algorithm is confirmed in Algorithm 1. 
 
 
 
 
4 The proposed ASP-UAVN approach 
In this section, the proposed method, which is based on a method of self-adaptation and self-defense 
against lethal attacks, is examined in full detail. Six sections are included in the ASP-UAVN: in Sect, 
4.1. The motion direction of the UAV is discussed. Sect 4.2. deals with the information exchange 
pattern of UAVNs. In Sect. 4.3 ASP-UAVN network model is discussed. In Sect, 4.4. the evaluation 
agent (to evaluate the routes) is discussed. Sect 4.5. deals with the decision-making agent, and in 
Sect. 4.6 defensive agent in ASP-UAVN is discussed. 
 
4.1 ASP-UAVN network model 
We take into account a UAS network where UAVs are arranged in an infinite 3D Euclidean space 
based on a homogeneous Poisson Point Process (PPP). A maximum one-hop communication range 
is included in the UAVs. A UAV is able to convey the data to the considered destination UAV 
straightly, or through a relay by one or further UAVs. A multi-hop outline is decode-and-forward, 
where an arriving packet is decoded by the relaying UAV then transmitted to the next hop. 
Moreover, a safe solution is presented in the ASP-UAVN network model, to protect the UAVs that 
are operative on two perspectives: First, it contains low false negative and positive rates and high 
detection accuracy. Second, it quickly discovers and separates attacks. In the suggested technique, 
the security issues like SF, WH, and SH attacks able to target the UAV are prohibited. Other 
properties should be added to Table 2 for detecting the attacks with high accurateness. 
 
 
Algorithm 1: Pseudo code for Negative Selection Algorithm 
1:   Procedure Negative Selection Algorithm 
2:     Input: A S ⊂ Ui  ("self-set"); a set Mo  ⊂ Ui  ("monitor set"); an integer ni  
3:     Output: For each element mo  ∈ Mo , either "normal UAV" or "malicious UAV". 
4:              // phase I: Training  
5:                  de ← empty set 
6:                        while   | De |   < ni     do 
7:                                             de ← the random detector set 
8:                                          if de does not match any element of Si  then 
9:                                                 insert de  into De  
10:                                        End if 
11:                    End while 
12:             // phase II: Classification  
13:                              For each mo  ∈ mo  do 
14:                     if mo  matches any detector de  ∈ De  then 
15:            output " mo  is non-self" (an attacker) 
16:                     else 
17:                                                    output " mo  is self" 
18:                     End if 
19:                             End For 
20s: End Procedure 
 4.2 Information exchange pattern of UAS 
The information is exchanged through the typical process. Originally, a message is delivered by a 
source ground station (
srcG ) to a UAV ( 1U ). Then, this UAV passes through a distance ( 1D ) to 
satisfy and send the message to another UAV (
2U ). The message is delivered then by this UAV to 
another UAV (
3U ) continuing in the same mode until delivering the message by the final UAV ( NU
)to the ground station in the destination (
DSTG ). To minimize the latency in delivering end-to-end 
packets, each UAV in this procedure is directed to satisfy the next UAV exactly at the selected 
time. 
However, in real environments as a result of the different performances of UAVs owing to changes 
in environmental uncertainties and engines, they fly at various velocities, hence, it is impracticable 
to anticipate that all UAVs can follow the same pattern. For example, UAVs with greater speeds 
may pass longer distances in comparison to others. Furthermore, it is possible to establish a 
communication line within two UAVs only into the communication range. Hence, it is essential to 
develop an association between UAVs. By the two UAVs in the communication range, or by their 
similar connection area, they will be able to exchange the information packets. This process needs a 
huge deal of time. No data packet exchange is probably happened by a UAV traveling in a 
connectionless area or outside the connection area. 
 
 
4.3 Motion Direction of the UAV 
To offer motion for the UAVs, in this work, the smooth turn (ST) mobility model was employed. 
ST makes the UAVs contain smoother trajectories such as taking turns with a larger radius or flying 
in straight trajectories. Thus, ST has a wide usage in analyzing UASs. This model can capture the 
UAVs’ acceleration correlation in both spatial and temporal domains accommodating the analysis 
and design. Based on [27], a uniform distribution exists for the ST model’s stationary node leading 
to some closed-form connectivity. 
 
 
Table 2: Lethal attacks features 
 
 
 
All the notations and abbreviations used in this article (proposed method section and other sections) 
are given in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
Cyber security threats Features 
Wormhole attack  Deceiving UAVs in the process of discovering the route 
Selective forwarding attack  Deceiving UAVs in the process of discovering the route 
Sybil attck  Deceiving UAVs in the process of discovering the route 
Table 3: Acronyms and notations. 
Acronyms Abbreviated acronyms  Notation Abbreviated notations 
3NS −  Network Simulator 3  RREQ  Route Request 
NAM  Network Animator  RREP  Route Reply 
IDS  Intrusion Detection System  
SUAV  Source UAV  
HIS  Human Immune System  
DUAV   Destination UAV  
AIS  Artificial Immune System  ST Smooth Turn 
ASP UAVNs−  Agent-Based Self-Protective 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Networks 
 Th  Threshold 
UAV  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles  ( )mP r   Probability malicious (route) 
GPS  Global Positioning System  SSI   Signal Strength Intensity 
WH  Wormhole  
rF   Fitness route 
SF  Selective Forwarding  
MUAV
P  Probability Malicious UAV  
SH  Sinkhole  MaxRTT  Maximum RTT 
FP  False positive   iSSI  Signal Strength Intensity i 
FN  False negative   MaxSSI  Maximum SSI 
TP  True positive   D  Distance 
TN  True negative   R  Route 
DR  Detection rate  AS  Antigen Self 
SFA  Security Framework Aircraft  Ab  Anti-body 
DoS  Denial of Service  UAVNs Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Networks 
Ag  Anti-gen  PLR Packet Loss Rate 
 
Employing Agents to Detect Attacking UAVs: In our proposed method, the safest route from the 
starting point to the destination is chosen according to a self-matching system. In this method, a 
multi-agent system using an artificial immune system is employed to detect the attacking UAV and 
choose the safest route. In the proposed ASP-UAVN, the route request packet (RREQ) is initially 
transmitted from the source UAV to the destination UAV to detect the existing routes. Then, once 
the route response packet (RREP) is received, a self-protective method using agents and the 
knowledge base is employed to choose the safest route and detect the attacking UAVs. In ASP-
UAVN, three types of agents are considered, including: 
• Evaluation agent (to evaluate the routes) 
• Decision making agent 
• Defensive agent 
These agents have modules distributed in different segments of the UAS, and each have a distinct 
responsibility. All agents are connected to the knowledge base to register the data and utilize the 
registered information. Figure 4 demonstrates the relationship between the agents and between the 
agents and the knowledge base. In the proposed method, agents are considered to detect Selective 
Forwarding attack, Wormhole attack, and Sybil attack. 
 
 
 
 Figure 4: Relationship between agents with the knowledge base and UAV network 
 
 
 
 
4.4 The evaluation agent  
Antigens are considered as the set of all detected routes from the source UAV to the destination 
UAV. The considered evaluation agents are similar to the T-cells in the immune system: they are 
responsible for evaluating abnormal behavior of the existing UAVs in routes and reporting their 
behavior. These agents have three functional modules as follows: 
 
1. Module for Data Collection 
2. Module for Refinement 
3. Module for Communication with the Decision-Making Agent 
The evaluation agents in ASP-UAVN are agents that evaluate the existing routes to the destinations 
(i.e. the antigens); so that destructive behavior of the UAVs on each route can be detected. 
The routes evaluation agent can be in the form of a table in the source UAV that registers the 
existing routes to the destination. For instance, the UAV in the source S has three routes to the 
destination, namely R1, R2, and R3. The route evaluation agent is demonstrated in Table 4. 
In this process, the routes for which the RREP message is sent to the destination UAV are tested in 
terms of a security. For this aim, one “Hello Packet” is transmitted over each route, and the 
destination UAV is responsible for transmitting a confirmation packet on the routes containing 
UAVs, following the receiving of the “Hello Packet”. It is evident that if a route is contaminated 
with a destructive UAV, the “Hello Packet” will fail to reach the destination and thus, no 
confirmation packet will be received in the source. In such cases, the probability for the route to be 
contaminated increases (i.e. the value for ( )
MUAV
P r increases for the route r). On the other hand, if 
the “Hello Packet” reaches the destination, the confirmation packet will be received in the source, 
indicating that the route does not contain a destructive UAV (i.e. the value for ( )
MUAV
P r  decreases). 
The procedure for transmitting the “Hello Packet” is repeated 4 times. 
The initial value for ( )
MUAV
P r : If the desired route is secure and has no malicious UAV, the 
( )
MUAV
P r variable is set to zero. Conversely, if the route is not secure or in other words has a 
malicious UAV, this variable is set to 100. Next, to update the value for this variable, the source 
UAV transmits a “Hello Packet” to the destination UAV through all existing routes in its table in 4 
iterations. If a confirmation packet is received from the destination UAV, 25 units is decreased 
from the value of ( )
MUAV
P r . However, if no confirmation is received from the destination UAV, 15 
units is added to the value for ( )
MUAV
P r . This process is repeated 4 times during the route discovery 
process, and the value for ( )
MUAV
P r is updated for all routes. Finally, if the value for ( )
MUAV
P r  is 
more than 50 for a route, it is rejected. The rest of the routes are sent to the decision-making agent 
and the knowledge base. 
 
Table 4: Examining the attacker detection mechanism using the probability variable
MUAV
P (r)  
( )
MUAV
P r  
Confirmation that packet is not 
received 
Confirmation that packet is 
received 
Response from the routes 
MUAV
P (r) - 25   √ Response for Route 1 
MUAV
P (r) + 15  √  Response for Route 2 
 
The decision-making agent is capable of synthesizing the information on breaches to reach a precise 
decision regarding the breach. 
 
 
4.5 The decision-making agent 
The decision-making agent is similar to the B-Cells in the AIS, and is capable of making effective 
decisions regarding the distribution of the attacks. The main objective of the decision-making agent 
in the ASP-UAVN is detecting the existence of unfamiliar patterns in a potentially-large set of the 
existing familiar patterns. 
Moreover, when this agent detects a suspicious route, it transmits the information regarding its set 
to the knowledge base instantly, so that the knowledge base can contact the agent generator to 
generate new agents to evaluate, make decision, and defend against these unknown attacks. 
Making decision on the routes is carried out using 4 criteria, namely Delay, the Ratio for delivering 
healthy packets from the previous step ( HPDR ), Packet Loss Ratio (PLR), and the Frequency of 
sending packages in each route (FSR), according to the considered attacks. For instance, in some 
attacks, the destructive UAV deletes all packets, while in some others, the invading UAV deletes 
only some of the packets. 
Therefore, the decision-making agent examines these four criteria based on the information 
obtained during pre-acquisition and acquisition stages of every route. For suspicious routes, the 
decision-making agent determines the threshold and transmits a warning to the defensive agent so 
that it can detect the destructive UAVs. In Table 5, the considered equation for the threshold is in a 
way that the existence of high delay, high PLR, low ratio for receiving the Hello packet, and high 
number of repeats (i.e. transferring repeated packets) denotes the existence of a destructive UAV in 
the route. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Decision making agent 
Suspicious routes Delay PLR PDR FSR 
R1 30ms 15% 85% 24 
R2 10ms 25% 75% 3 
R3 20ms 5% 95% 2 
 
 
Threshold 
            
Delay PLR MaxPDR FSR
Th
MaxDelay MaxPLR PDR MaxFSR
 
= + + + 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
 
( )DRP r : The value for the threshold (Th) for each route is determined according to the four criteria 
mentioned, and is registered in ( )DRP r . The route with the highest threshold is eliminated and is sent 
to the defensive agent. 
 
4.6 Defensive agent 
Defensive agents act similar to the antibodies exuded by the lymphocyte. Their functional modules 
include replication and reduction modules. Defensive agents can evaluate the existing UAVs in the 
defective route to perform proper actions according to the information provided by the decision-
making agent. According to the procedure, when an attacker UAV is detected, the neighboring 
UAVs are requested not to resend the packets they received from the attacker UAVs.  
   To detect the attacker in the designated route, the agents replicate themselves in the vicinity of 
each node and send some Test packets over the route in consecutive periods. A test packet is a 
packet similar to the normal packets in the UAS network. Therefore, the attacking UAV receives 
and tries to delete it. The defensive agent detects the destructive UAV in a suspicious route using 
the following Eq. (2): 
 
 
( )
1 1
1
                          
*
          
1
  1
* 1        t t t
M X For t
M X M For t  −
= =

= + − 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
Where   is the regulation factor coefficient with a constant value between 0 and 1, tX is the value 
for the test packet in a time interval t , and tM is the mean transmission value for the test packets in 
every time interval t . 
 
In every interval, a predetermined number of test packets are transmitted in the designated route. 
Then, for each UAV, the defensive agent determines the number of the test packets transmitted by 
that specific UAV. If the total number of the test packets transmitted by a UAV is fewer or equal to 
the value for tM , it demonstrates that this UAV is a destructive UAV that removes a number of the 
packets. The value for the coefficient is considered a constant value between 0 and 1. Considering 
lesser value for this coefficient indicates higher expected probability for the loss of packets. On the 
other hand, if the value for   is considered closer to 1, it indicates that we expect fewer packets to 
be lost. 
Using this method, the defensive agents can successfully isolate the attacking UAVs, as illustrated 
in Figure 5. To remove the breaches, the defensive agents replicate themselves and barricade further 
replication of the attacker after a certain time interval by removing the attackers. 
 
 
Figure 5: Defensive agents replicate themselves to evaluate and detect  
the destructive UAVs in suspicious routes. 
 
 
When the defensive agent detects a destructive UAV, it will ask all the UAVs in the route to 
disregard and delete any packets received from this UAV. In addition, it sends a message regarding 
detection of the destructive UAV to the knowledge base, so that the destructive UAV is no longer 
employed for route finding. 
 
The Knowledge Base Layer: The knowledge base is in connection with all agents, and they 
needed to be intelligently evolved to defend against a wide range of attacks. The knowledge base 
includes the following stages to choose the most secure route (based on the information received 
from the agents) for transmission of data in the immune memory: 
Affinity: as defined in the immune system of the human body, the main objective of B-Cells is 
creating antibodies against antigens, and ultimately evolving into memory cells once they are 
activated by antigen interactions. The memory cells generate more antibodies in shorter time during 
further impacts with the same antigen. In our proposed method, to choose the best B-cell and to 
perform affinity, routes with low latency, low ratio for loss of packets, high ratio for receiving 
packets, and low packet re-transmission number are chosen. In other words, at this stage, routes 
with low threshold value are chosen. 
 
 
Matching: in this stage, routes with low threshold are compared and evaluated using the following 
two attributes to choose the safest route. In addition, the most significant attribute of the attacker-
detection mechanism is its capability to be corrected over time. In other words, they need to be 
correctable and have the capacity for easy learning. 
 
The details for the first and second attribute of matching: the details are described in the following 
two attributes: 
 
Attribute 1, round trip time between the source UAV and the destination UAV: the knowledge 
base calculates the round-trip time for all the received routes from the source UAV to the 
destination UAV based on the acquired information. 
 
Attribute 2, the signal strength index of the received signal: the invader generates a high 
strength signal (the SSI that a destructive UAV has generated) to gain control over the UAV. The 
procedure for detection is that the knowledge base initially collects all the generated SSIs from the 
transmitters. It then compares these values with the value for a normal SSI (i.e. SSI generated by a 
normal UAV). In this manner, suspicious generated signal strengths and normal ones are 
distinguished. 
 
Finalizing the Detection Set: for all the routes with low threshold (Th) value, the safest route is 
selected according to the Algorithm 1 demonstrated in Figure 6: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: The algorithm for selecting a secure and reliable route 
 
According to Algorithm 1, once the threshold value (Th ) for each route was determined and the 
destructive routes were refined, the routes with low Th value are once again compared according to 
the function 𝐹𝑟 for the fitness route, and the route with the highest rF  is selected as the safest route. 
 
Hyper-mutation: among the evaluated routes, those with approximately similar conditions (i.e. 
minimum threshold level and maximum evaluation function) are transferred into the hyper-
mutation stage. At this stage, the routes are evaluated with another criterion (i.e. in a similar 
condition, the route with the highest PDR is selected), so that the safest route for the UAVs is 
selected. 
 
Registration in the Security Memory: the routes that meet the conditions of the equation UAVRR, 
or those that have the highest PDR value following the hyper-mutation stage, are the safest routes. 
Therefore, they will be registered in the security memory for further use. 
The flowchart for the proposed ASP-UAVN is demonstrated in Figure 7. 
 
Algorithm 1: Pseudo code for ASP-UAVN approach 
1:   Initialize the Antigen collection time to 15s; 
2:   Initialize the Antigen towards min to 80s; 
3:   Initialize the Delay buffer size max to 1400; 
4:   Initialize the Storing time to 10s; 
5:   Initialize the Max number of antigens to 1000; 
6:   Let ( )DRP r as the probability for destructiveness of the route 
7:   Let N represents the number of candidate routes between the source UAV and the destination UAV 
8:   Let rF   represents the fitness route 
9:   Let PRUAV  represents a secure and reliable route between UAVs 
10: Procedure Selecting a safe and reliable route 
11:             1            For r To N Do=   
12:                              Calculate the value forTh  in every route   
13:       ( ) ( ) (    ) Th mI ax r PMF r  Then 
14:                                             Remove the route and send a warning to the defensive agent 
15:                                        Else 
16:                                             Select routes with the lowest Th  value ( )Min Th  
17:                                             Calculate the value for
rF according to this equation: 
18:                                                 ( , ) ir i i
i
MaxRTT SSI
F RTT SSI
RTT MaxSSI
   
= +   
  
   
19:                                            The route with the following criteria is selected: 
20:                                                 ( ) ( )&PR rUAV Min Th Max F=   
21:        EndIf   
22:        EndFor   
23: End Procedure 
 Figure 7: Flowchart of the ASP-UAVN 
 
Analyzing the characteristics of ASP-UAVN: There are numerous advantageous characteristics in 
the proposed ASP-UAVN by employing artificial immune system and multi-agent intelligent 
technology. In the following, a number of these characteristics are discussed. 
Distributivity: As our considered agents are distributed in all UAVs similar to the distribution of 
lymphocytes in the body, and since the knowledge base is updated periodically or when the UAV is 
under attack, the three considered agents are logically independent, with intermediaries to enable 
communication. The evaluation agents are capable of controlling the performance of the UAVs on 
the route via transmitting HELLO messages. Moreover, the decision-making agents analyze the 
performance of the UAVs over the route based on the considered criteria to detect destructive routes. 
Furthermore, defensive agents can detect attackers independently and remove them from the 
network. 
Independence: Similar to the body immune system that does not require external administration and 
maintenance for classification and elimination of the pathogenic agents, the knowledge base and the 
agents can evaluate, make decision, and defend against the attacker UAVs in the three considered 
attacks cooperatively (with the cooperation of other UAVs) or independently. In ASP-UAVN, the 
knowledge base and the agents can be updated or reproduced independently. 
Self-protection: Similar to the body immune system that is capable of learning to defend against 
new pathogens and detecting the known pathogenic agents through the use of immune memory, the 
proposed ASP-UAVN is capable of detecting these attacks via a cooperation between the considered 
agents and the use of the knowledge base. 
The proposed ASP-UAVN is a self-matching method that all the stages of self-matching, as 
illustrated in Figure 5, are applied to it according to the following steps: 
Administered Source: the source in this project is the UAS network. 
Sensor: Collecting UAV information via transmitting RREQ and receiving RREP in the UAS 
network. 
Evaluation: This component collects the UAV information by employing the received RREPs. This 
activity is carried out using the data collection module in the evaluation agent. 
Analysis: This component receives the information between the UAVs from the evaluation 
component. It then analyzes the acquired information to determine the desired routes. Using 
refinement and communication modules from the evaluation agent, this stage carries out its 
responsibility by refining the detected routes and discarding a number of them, followed by 
transmitting the desired routes to the decision-making agent. 
Planning: this component makes decision regarding the safest routes. The planning for this 
component in the proposed ASP-UAVN is performed according to the decision-making agent by 
evaluating the four considered criteria and determining the value for the threshold (Th). 
Execution: This component provides mechanisms for the network to perform planning. In the 
proposed ASP-UAVN, execution is performed in two stages, namely defensive agent (to delete the 
destructive UAVs), and knowledge base (to select the safest route via affinity and matching). 
Knowledge: The common knowledge in the self-matching structure is the knowledge base 
employed according to the Figure 1 in the proposed method. 
Effector: This component is employed to apply the final decision to the environment. In the 
proposed method, it is carried out via transmitting the selected safe route to the UAS by the 
knowledge base. 
The proposed ASP-UAVN is effective and efficient in defense against Selective Forwarding, 
Wormhole, and Sybil attacks. ASP-UAVN is capable of effectively detecting these attacks in 
cooperation with the agents. In addition, in normal conditions, only a limited number of agents exist 
in the UAV. However, agents can reproduce and increase swiftly when needed, and decrease once 
the attacker is detected. In addition, the following two methods are considered in the proposed 
method to keep the knowledge base up to date: 
• Periodic polling from all agents regarding the collection of abnormal behaviors of the 
network and operational performance of the agents. 
• Active registration of information in the knowledge base by the agents if necessary (e.g. 
when an unknown attack occurs in large scale). 
 
5 Theoretical analysis of ASP-UAVN  
In this section, the proposed method is evaluated using theoretical analysis in two phases. The first 
phase involves the theoretical security analysis of the ASP-UAVN. In the second phase, the ASP-
UAVN method is analyzed in terms of complexity and packet transmission. 
 
5.1 Theoretical analysis of security 
The theoretical security analysis of the proposed ASP-UAVN method and its effectiveness against 
malicious UAVs will be presented in detail in this section. The main part of theoretical security 
analysis is shown in Theorem 1. This describes the number of packets deleted by malicious UAVs. 
Therefore, according to this theorem, if malicious UAVs are identified and discarded from network 
data transmission, a secure connection will be obtained among the UAVs in the network. Therefore, 
we first provide definitions and then theorems and proofs. 
Definition 1. The variable receivedpacket  shows packets that have been successfully transmitted to the 
destination UAV. 
Definition 2. The variable droppedpacket  shows packets that were not successfully transmitted to the 
destination, i.e., were removed by malicious UAVs. 
Definition 3. The variable TotalPacket  shows the sum of receivedpacket  and droppedpacket . 
Definition 4. The variable PDR shows the rate of receivedpacket  divided by TotalPacket . 
Theorem 1. The conditional expression ( ) ( )dropped received* 0packet PDR packet−   indicates an ideal 
UAV. The number of missing packages ( ) can be neglected. The number of missing packets is a 
fraction of the number of packets transmitted. In particular, an upper limit for   can be defined as 
below: 
 
( )dropped received( )*packet PDR packet −   (3) 
 
Proof: In general, suppose there are _Total N UAV nodes in the UAV network where _Total M of 
them are malicious so that the condition _ _Total M Total N  is met. ( )_ *Total M L  is sum of the 
links controlled by malicious UAVs. The maximum value for the ( )_ *Total M L  is equal to 
( )_ *Total M N . 
    For example, consider a malicious link ( linkFault ) in a UAV network which has been repeatedly 
reported as a malicious link for 
linkFault
c times while changing to a normal UAV for 
linkFault
r  times. The 
maximum weight of the link 
linkFault
w is equal to ( )_ *Total M len  where ( )_ *Total M len is the 
maximum length of an error-free route in the UAV network. If the weight of the link reaches to 
( )_ *Total M len , its efficiency is considered lower than that of the non-defected routes. Therefore, 
linkFault
w  can be calculated according to the equation below: 
 
( )
2
Fault Faultlink link
link
c r
Faultw
−
=  (4) 
 
The minimum number of times it is reported as a broken link is 
droppedpacket

 
 
 
 where   is the 
number of packets deleted by malicious UAVs, which is indicated by a defected route between the 
UAVs. Therefore, according to Eq. (5): 
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_ *
0
link
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Fault Total M L
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c
 
  
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(5) 
 
 
Where  is average deviation. Similarly, the maximum number of times it has reverted to a normal 
UAV is equal to received
packet
TotalPacket

 
 
 
 
 
. Therefore, according to Eq. (6): 
( )
received
_ *
0
link
link
Fault
Fault Total M L
packet
r
PDR

 
  
 −          
  
  
 
(6) 
 
 
Considering Eq. (7), we have: 
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(7) 
 
 
According to Equation (5), ( ) log
link link linkFault Fault Fault
c f w−   and therefore: 
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( )
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link link link
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By combining Eq. (7) and Eq. (8), we have: 
( )( )( )
( )
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(9) 
 
 
Where ( )( )*log _ *b Total M len =  and   is the number of packets deleted by the malicious UAV in 
each operation. 
 
( )( )
( )( )
dropped received
2
*
* _ * _ *log _ *
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(10) 
 
 
Therefore, the amount of malicious UAV intrusions can be limited in the network. The ideal 
situation is when there is no malicious UAV in the network, where 
( ) ( )dropped received* 0packet TotalPacket packet−  . If the number of malicious UAVs exceeds a threshold, 
they will be quickly identified and discarded from packet transmission between the UAVs using Eq. 
(11): 
 
( )
dropped( )
_ _ 1
thrpacket mal
Total M Total M
 →
= −
 
(11) 
 
 
The rate of intrusion decreases by decreasing ( )_ * _Total M Total N . If all the malicious UAVs are 
detected, ( )_ * _Total M Total N  will be zero which is ideal. Therefore, when evaluating the 
forwarding performance of the packages as well as routing operations in the UAV network, this 
mechanism will protect the network against wormhole, selective forwarding and sink hole attacks. 
As a result, the communication among all the UAVs in the network will be secure. 
 
 
5.2 Theoretical analysis of the complexity of time and message 
In this section, we estimate costs in terms of the number of packets exchanged and the complexity of 
time and message. The meaning of acronyms and notations used in the equations are given in Table 
6. 
Table 6: Major acronyms and notations used. 
Notations Means 
Range  Communication range between UAVs 
b  Messages between sourceUAV  and destinationUAV  
x  Distance 
n  Number of UAVs 
N  Neighbor 
 
Time complexity: The time complexity is equal to the total time complexity of the RREQ 
messages and forwarded RREPs, and the packets delivered. Eq. (12) demonstrates 
ASP UAVNTimeComplexity − . 
 
( )*3ASP UAVN RREQTimeComplexity TimeComplexity− =  (12) 
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, 1UAVi UAVIDelay + : It takes time for the route to move between the UAVs that made the connection. 
 
Messages complexity: The message complexity is equal to the total time complexity of the RREQ 
messages and forwarded RREPs, and the packets delivered. Eq. (13) demonstrates 
ASP UAVNMessageComplexity − . 
( )( )2* 1ASP UAVNMessageComplexity b n− = + −  (13) 
 
Where, 
1
x
b
Range
 
= + 
 
 
 
 
Finally, the complexity of the route discovery process is equal to the re-forwarding of the RREQ 
package by the UAV other than the destinationUAV  that is a complexity of ( )log n . If we consider the 
entire UAV network as a single, independent system, the complexity will be ( )n . 
 
 
6 Evaluating the Performance 
The ASP-UAVN performance is assessed in the following section to avoid the lethal attacks. 
 
6.1 Performance metrics 
Here, the performance and effectiveness of our suggested ASP-UAVN method are systematically 
assessed with complete simulations. A comparison is performed between the results and with SFA, 
BRUIDS, and SUAS methods proposed in [9], [10] and [11], respectively. The PDR, PLR, false 
negative, false positive, and detection ratio are assessed. The meaning of notations used in the 
equations are given in Table 7. 
 
 
Table 7: The parameters specified for PDR and PLR 
Notations Means 
iX  Number of packets received by node i 
iY  Number of packets sent by node i 
n  Experiments 
 
 
PDR: This criterion represents the rate of packets that were successfully delivered to the 
destination [25, 26]. 
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(14) 
PLR: This measure represents the percentage of packets deleted by malicious UAVs. The higher 
the percentage, the worse the performance of the method, but on the contrary, if the percentage of 
this variable is low, it shows the efficiency and excellent performance of the method [27, 28]. The 
rate of packets removed is calculated by Eq. (15). 
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(15) 
 
FP: The FP is determined by the total number of UAVs mistakenly found as the intruder UAVs 
divided by the total number of normal UAVs [29, 30]. Hence, Eq. (16) illustrates the 
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FN: The rate of the intruder UAV to total normal UAVs incorrectly signed as a normal UAV [31]. 
The calculation is proved by Eq. (17). 
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DR: Ratio of intruder nodes to total lethal attacks that were correctly diagnosed as intruder attack. 
Eq. (18) determines the DR [32]. 
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Antibody definition: An antibody is a kind of protein that is generated in the immune system to 
answer the existence of a special antigen. It circulates in the blood or remains in the generating 
location to attack the antigen (usually, the foreign object like a bacteria, a virus, even a normal 
body tissue, or a food material), and makes it harmless. Each antibody recognizes a special 
antigen as its target. The antibodies are secreted from the Plasmocytes, and they are related to 
Humoral immunity. After the collision of lymphocyte B with its special antigen, it is separated, 
and it creates a B memory cell and the plasmocyte. The memory cells are always in ambush to 
divide rapidly when a re-collision with that antigen. The plasmocytes don’t have any antigen 
receivers, and their duty is antibody generation. Moreover, they have a rough endoplasmic 
reticulum and an extensive Golgi body. The antibodies are generated actively and entered into the 
blood. An antibody is soluble in blood, so it called Humoral immunity. (Humors: body fluids 
including lymph blood and interstitial fluid) antibodies have an antigen receiver similar to B 
lymphocyte and B memory that is the antigen complementary. The antibody doesn’t destroy the 
antigen, but it neutralized it. It sticks to the antigen most simply and prevents its connection to the 
host cell. In this state, in addition to antigen inactivation, it makes easy macrophage phagocytosis. 
The antibodies affect the creation of asthma, allergies, and autoimmunity. It means that 
inappropriate generation of them results in these diseases. Also, it should not be misunderstood 
that the antibodies are not useful. Because without the antibodies, many diseases kick the human 
out. An antibody has a low effect on fighting cancer and transplant cells. 
 
 
6.2 Simulation setup and comparing algorithms 
Since implementing and debugging UAVNs in real networks is difficult, considering simulations 
as a basic design instrument is necessary. The primary benefit of simulation is simplification of 
analysis and verification of protocol, especially in large systems [33-35]. In this part, the 
suggested method’s performance is assessed by NS-3 as the simulation instrument, and then the 
results will be discussed. It should be noted that all ASP-UAVN, SFA, BRUIDS, and SUAS 
settings and parameters are considered as equal. 
 
 
6.3 Simulation results and Analysis 
The ASP-UAVN performance is analyzed in this section under the four scenarios (Table 8). 
Initially, 500 nodes are deployed in the UAV area in a uniform manner. Table 8 gives some major 
parameters. 
Table 8: Setting of simulation parameters. 
Parameters Value 
Channel type Channel/Wireless channel 
MAC Layer MAC/802.11. b  
Traffic type CBR 
UAV speed 180 m/s 
Transmission layer UDP 
Packet size 512 Byte 
Malicious UAV 5%, 10%, 15% 
Type of attacks WH, SF, SH  
Transmission range 30 M 
Selection of target UAV Random 
 
 
Table 9 shows the important parameters used in all four scenarios. In this table, the percentage of 
destructive UAVs is 5, 10, 15 and 20%. 
Table 9: The setting of simulation parameters for four scenarios.  
Scenario #1 Scenario #2 
Number of Antibody 200 Number of Antibody 200 
Malicious UAV rate 5% Malicious UAV rate 10% 
Topology 1000 x 1000 Topology 2000 x 2000 
Time 1000 Time 1000 
Scenario #3 Scenario #4 
Number of Antibody 200 Number of Antibody 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300,350 
Malicious UAV rate 15% Malicious UAV rate 20% 
Topology 3000 x 3000 Topology 4000 x 4000 
Time 1000 Time 1000 
 
In Table 10-14, the proposed method is compared with all three methods in all criteria. The 
number of antibodies is defined as 50 to 350. By increasing the number of antibodies, the results 
of each method are given in the following tables. As can be seen from the tables, the proposed 
method has performed very well. 
Table 10: PDR (in %) vs number of antibodies. 
                 PDR (%)  
Number of Antibody BRUIDS SFA SUAS-HIS ASP-UAVN 
50 37 38 57 82 
100 38 40 61 83 
150 40 42 65 84 
200 44 46 59 87 
250 42 48 56 88 
300 40 51 64 90 
350 46 55 70 91 
 
 
Table 11: PLR (in %) vs number of antibodies. 
                 PLR (%)  
Number of Antibody BRUIDS SFA SUAS-HIS ASP-UAVN 
50 60 58 41 16 
100 57 53 38 14 
150 55 48 37 13 
200 50 43 35 11 
250 48 40 34 10 
300 45 39 32 9 
350 41 36 30 8.5 
 
  
Table 12: FP (in %) vs number of antibodies. 
                 FPR (%)  
Number of Antibody BRUIDS SFA SUAS-HIS ASP-UAVN 
50 0.083 0.069 0.059 0.037 
100 0.078 0.061 0.057 0.032 
150 0.064 0.052 0.048 0.03 
200 0.059 0.052 0.042 0.028 
250 0.045 0.032 0.029 0.024 
300 0.038 0.03 0.025 0.02 
350 0.021 0.026 0.018 0.019 
 
 
 
Table 13: FN (in %) vs number of antibodies. 
                 FNR (%)  
Number of Antibody BRUIDS SFA SUAS-HIS ASP-UAVN 
50 0.119 0.08 0.07 0.065 
100 0.102 0.077 0.067 0.0495 
150 0.1 0.071 0.061 0.055 
200 0.09 0.065 0.055 0.0485 
250 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.0465 
300 0.06 0.044 0.054 0.0425 
350 0.06 0.049 0.052 0.0385 
 
 
Table 14: DR (in %) vs number of antibodies. 
                 DR (%)  
Number of Antibody BRUIDS SFA SUAS-HIS ASP-UAVN 
50 71 68 75 81 
100 72 71 76 82 
150 73 74 77 84 
200 74 76 78 88 
250 75 77 79 90 
300 76 78 80 91 
350 77 79 81 92 
 
PDR: Figure 8 compares the proposed method in terms of packet delivery rate with all three 
methods mentioned. The proposed method has a high PDR due to the ability to quickly detect lethal 
attacks on a self-adaptive basis. Because it detects attacks quickly and does not allow these attacks 
to remove exchanges between UAVs. Because this is prevented, it makes sense to increase the 
package delivery rate on the network. As shown in the figure below, in the worst-case scenario, 
when the percentage of lethal attacks is equal to 20%, the efficiency of the proposed method, 
SUAS-HIS, SFA and BRUIDS are equal to 90, 40, 50, and 45%, respectively. Hence, the excellent 
performance of the ASP-UAVN method is achieved due to the efficient cooperation between the 
decision-maker and the defense agent. These modules mimic the misbehavior of a malicious UAV 
and use a law-based, and self-defense detection to detect the intrusion of a malicious UAVs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8 Comparison of the ASP-UAVN, SUAS-HIS, SFA and BRUIDS models in term of PDR. 
PLR: Figure 9 compares the performance of ASP-UAVN with that of SUAS-HIS, SFA, and 
BRUIDS for detection of the lethal attacks. As shown in the figure, ASP-UAVN decreases the 
packet loss rate by more than 10.45, 17.54% and 27.05% those of SUAS-HIS, SFA, and BRUIDS, 
respectively. 
 
  
 
 
 
Fig. 9 Comparison of the ASP-UAVN, SUAS-HIS, SFA and BRUIDS models in term of PLR. 
 
 
FP: Figure 10 presents the false positive rate in four scenarios against normal UAV counts and 
malicious UAV rates for ASP-UAVN, SUAS-HIS, SFA, and BRUIDS in lethal conditions. As 
shown in the diagrams, when the number of normal UAVs increases from 20 to 140 and the 
malicious UAV rate increases from 5 to 20 percent, the generated false positive rate of the proposed 
method has shown slower and lower growth than other methods. The false positive rate of the 
proposed method is less than 3 percent when the number of normal UAVs and malicious UAV rate 
are 120 and 5 percent respectively. However, this value is 17 percent for the SUAS-HIS method, 25 
percent for the SFA method, and 35 percent for the BRUIDS method. The reason for the superiority 
of the proposed scheme is the fast recognition of malicious UAVs and eliminating them with the 
cooperation of ground stations and normal UAVs using a self-protective method based on AIS. The 
aforementioned process is carried out using pre-trained rules saved in safety memory. 
 
  
 
 
  
Fig. 10 Comparison of the ASP-UAVN, SUAS-HIS, SFA and BRUIDS models in term of FP. 
 
 
FN: As shown in the diagrams, the false negative rate (FN) has shown little growth while this 
value is much higher for ASP-UAVN, SUAS-HIS, SFA, and BRUIDS. In Figure 11, the false 
negative rate of the proposed method is less than 1.5 percent when the number of UAVs is 120 but 
for the other three methods, it is 12 percent, 15 percent, and 18 percent respectively. Also, in figure 
11, when the number of antibodies is 350, FN is 0.04 in the proposed scheme. However, this value 
for the other three methods is 0.05, 0.06, and 0.07 respectively. The reason for the FN of the 
proposed method being low is the utilization of three evaluation, decision-making, and defensive 
agents that quickly detect malicious UAVs and remove them from the packet transmission 
operation among UAVs. 
  
  
  
 
Fig. 11 Comparison of the ASP-UAVN, SUAS-HIS, SFA and BRUIDS models in term of FN. 
 
 
DR: As shown in the diagrams 12, detection rate (DR) has decreased in all four methods according 
to the four scenarios, especially when the number of attackers is high. This decrease is much more 
for BRUIDS compared to other mechanisms. The proposed scheme can detect all the 
aforementioned attacks with a detection rate higher than 95 percent. This result is achieved when 
the number of normal UAVs and the malicious UAV rate are 120 and 5 percent respectively. The 
reason for the superiority of the proposed scheme is the fast identification of malicious UAVs and 
their elimination using the mapping performed in this scheme. This mapping is carried out between 
insecure routes defined as anti-genes and the pattern trained based on antibodies. This results in the 
identification of malicious UAVs and their elimination from the operation cycle. 
 
  
  
  
 
Fig. 12 Comparison of the ASP-UAVN, SUAS-HIS, SFA and BRUIDS models in term of DR. 
 
 
7 Conclusion and Future work 
UAVs have increasing utilization in civilian and military applications recently. Communication security 
is one of the critical factors ensuring the appropriate UAVs’ operation. Rather, UAVs can be captured by 
adversaries. In this study, it was confirmed that some devastating attacks can be launched simply at a 
low-cost including wormhole, Sybil and sinkhole attacks, which appears complicated. Hence, it is 
important to take into account the communication security for UAVs severely. In ASP-UAVN proposed 
method, the safest route from the source UAV to the destination UAV is chosen according to a self-
protective system. In this method, a multi-agent system using an artificial immune system is employed to 
detect the attacking UAV and choose the safest route. In the proposed P-method, the route request packet 
(RREQ) is initially transmitted from the source UAV to the destination UAV to detect the existing routes. 
Then, once the route response packet (RREP) is received, a self-protective method using agents and the 
knowledge base is employed to choose the safest route and detect the attacking UAVs.  
 
 
The main advantage of the ASP-UAVN is that the suspect node can be regarded as a normal UAV in the 
network again followed by a rational penalty. Here, we assessed the ASP-UAVN scheme performance 
utilizing NS-3 and indicated its high level of detection rate and security (more than 94.5%), low FN (less 
than 4.95%), low FP (less than 07.104%), and high PDR (over 87.8%), in comparison with the present 
techniques. In future work, the Firefly algorithm will be used to cluster UAVs and an authentication 
mechanism will be used to validate UAVs on two security levels to prevent attacks. It is also 
recommended to use Firefly optimization to reduce power consumption and malicious attacks on drones. 
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